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In his famous thought experiment, Wigner assigns an entangled state to the composite quantum
system made up of Wigner’s friend and her observed system. While the two of them have different
accounts of the process, each Wigner and his friend can in principle verify his/her respective state
assignments by performing an appropriate measurement. As manifested through a click in a detector
or a specific position of the pointer, the outcomes of these measurements can be regarded as reflecting
directly observable ”facts”. Reviewing arXiv:1507.05255, I will derive a no-go theorem for observer-
independent facts, which would be common both for Wigner and the friend. I will then analyze this
result in the context of a newly derived theorem arXiv:1604.07422, where Frauchiger and Renner
prove that ”single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent”. It is argued
that ”self-consistency” has the same implications as the assumption that observational statements
of different observers can be compared in a single (and hence an observer-independent) theoretical
framework. The latter, however, may not be possible, if the statements are to be understood as
relational in the sense that their determinacy is relative to an observer.
A. Introduction
One of the most debated situations concerning the quantum measurement problem is described in
the thought experiment of so called “Wigner’s friend”. The experiment involves a quantum system
and an observer (Wigner’s friend) who performs measurements on this system in a sealed laboratory.
A “super-observer” (Wigner) is placed outside the laboratory. While for the friend the measurement
outcome is reflected in a property of the device recording it (e.g. in the form of a click in a photo-
detector or a certain position of a pointer device), Wigner can describe the process unitarily on the
basis of the information that is in principle available to him. At the end of the process, the friend
projects the state of the system corresponding to the observed outcome, whereas Wigner assigns
a specific entangled state to the system and the friend, which he can verify performing a further
experiment. When Wigner’s friend observes an outcome, does the state collapse for Wigner too? And
if not, how can we reconcile their different accounts of the process?
The thought experiment of Wigner’s friend has great conceptual value, as it challenges different
approaches to understanding quantum theory. In his original work [1], Wigner designed the exper-
iment to support his view that consciousness is necessary to complete the quantum measurement
process. According to many-worlds interpretation [2], there are many copies of Wigner’s friend in
different ”worlds”. Each copy observes one outcome, a different one in each world. According to
the Copenhagen, relational [3] and Quantum Bayesian [5] interpretations, the state is defined only
relative to observer; relative to the friend, the state is projected, while relative to Wigner, it is in a
superposition. Either way, supporters of any of these interpretation, will arrive at the same predic-
tions in Wigner’s verifying experiment. In contrast, objective collapse theories [6–8] predict that the
quantum state collapses when a superposed system reaches a certain threshold of mass, size, com-
plexity etc., such that it becomes impossible to even prepare the entangled state of Wigner’s friend
and the system. Consequently, Wigner’s state assignment can statistically be disproved repeating the
verifying experiment.
The descriptions of ”what is happening inside the lab” as given by Wigner and Wigner’s friend
respectively will differ. This difference need not pose a consistency problem for quantum theory, for
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2example, if one takes the view that the theory gives the physical description relative to observer and
her/his measuring apparatus in agreement with Ref. [3]. As long as the two observers do not exchange
the information about their outcomes, they will remain separated form each other, each holding a
different description of the systems with respect to their individual experimental arrangements. And
if they do compare their predictions, they will agree. For example, should the friend communicate
her result to Wigner, this would collapse the state he assigns to the friend and the system. This
suggests that there should be no tension in accepting that, relative to their experimental arrangements,
Wigner’s friend in her measurement, as well as Wigner in his verifying measurement, each obtains a
respective measurement outcome. Since these outcomes are usually manifested as clicks in detectors
or definite positions of a pointer, they can be considered as directly accessible ”facts”. Quite naturally,
the question arises: Can the facts as observed by Wigner and by Wigner’s friend be jointly considered
as objective properties of the world, in which case we might call them ”facts of the world”? What we
mean with this question is whether there exists any theory, potentially different from quantum theory,
where a joint probability may be assigned for Wigner’s outcome and for that of his friend.
Reviewing the results of Ref. [10], I will derive a Bell type no-go theorem for observer-independent
facts, showing that there can be no theory in which Wigner’s and Wigner’s friend’ facts can jointly
be considered as (local) objective properties. More precisely, I will show that the assumptions of
”locality”, ”freedom of choice” and ”universality of quantum theory” (the latter in the sense that
there are no constrains of the system to which the theory can be applied) are incompatible with the
assumption of observer-independent facts, i.e. under the assumptions one cannot define joint prob-
abilities for Wigner’s outcome and for that of Wigner’s friend. This might indicate that in quantum
theory, we can only define facts relative to an observation and an observer. I will then analyze the
relation of these results to the theorem developed by Frauchinger and Renner [19], which proves
that ”single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent”. In particular, I will
argue that implications of their ”self-consistency” requirement are equivalent to that of a theoretical
framework in which the truth values of the observational statements by Wigner and Wigner’s friend
can be jointly assigned and then verified whether they are consistent or not. However, in the view of
the no-go theorem, this in general need not be possible in a physical theory; the theory may operate
only with facts relative to observer.
It should be emphasized that the no-go theorem applies to ”facts” understood as ”immediate ex-
periences of observers”; it may refer to what various interpretations of quantum mechanics assume
to be ”real” (e.g. the wave function of the Universe, Bohmian’s trajectories etc.) only to the extent
to which these ”realities” give rise to directly observable facts in terms of detector clicks or pointer
positions.
B. Deutsch’s version of Wigner’s friend experiment
The standard description of the Wigner-friend thought experiment involves a quantum two-level
system (system 1, e.g. a spin-1/2 particle) which can give rise to two outcomes upon measurement
(e.g. two opposite directions when passing through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus). The outcomes are
recorded by a measurement apparatus and eventually in the friend’s memory (system 2). Now, Wigner
is placed outside the isolated laboratory in which the experiment takes place and can perform a quan-
tum measurement on the overall system (spin-1/2 particle + friend’s laboratory). Take it that all
experiments are carried out a sufficient number of times to collect statistics.
For concreteness, suppose that a measurement of spin along z is performed on a particle initially
prepared in state |x+〉S = 1√2(|z+〉S + |z−〉S), where subscript S refers to the spin. After the
measurement is completed, the measurement apparatus is found in one of many perceptively different
macroscopic configurations, like different positions of a pointer along a scale. If the apparatus pointer
is found in a specific position along the scale, the friend can say that the observable spin z has the
3value ”up” or ”down”. Note that for the present argument, we need not make any assumption about
how the friend formally describes the spin and the apparatus or even if she uses quantum theory for
it. All what is needed is the assumption that the friend perceives a definite outcome.
Wigner uses quantum theory to describe the friend’s measurement. From his perspective, the mea-
surement is described by a unitary transformation. The different possible spin states |z+〉S and |z−〉S
are supposed to get entangled to the perceptively different macroscopic configurations of the appara-
tus and the parts of the laboratory including the friend’s memory. The states of different macroscopic
configurations are represented by orthogonal states |Fz+〉F and |Fz−〉F , respectively. We assume that
the state of the composite system ”spin + friend’s laboratory” is given by:
|Φ〉SF = 1√
2
(|z+〉S |Fz+〉F + |z−〉S |Fz−〉F ) , (1)
where the particular phase (here ”+”) between the two amplitudes in Eq. (1) is specified by the
measurement interaction in control of Wigner. (Note that if Wigner would not know this phase
due to lack of control of it, he would describe the ”spin + friend’s laboratory” in an incoherent
mixture of the two possibilities.) Wigner can verify his state assignment (1), for example, by per-
forming a Bell state measurement in the basis: |Φ±〉SF = 1√2 (|z+〉S |Fz+〉F ± |z−〉S |Fz−〉F ) and
|Ψ±〉SF = 1√2 (|z+〉S |Fz−〉F ± |z−〉S |Fz+〉F ).
The fact that the friend and Wigner have different accounts of the friend’s measurement process
is at the heart of the discussion surrounding the Wigner-friend thought experiment. Still the differ-
ence needs not give rise to any inconsistency in practicing quantum theory, since the two descriptions
belong to two different observers, who remain separated in making predictions for their respective
systems. The novelty of Deutsch’s proposal [9] lies in the possibility for Wigner to acquire direct
knowledge on whether the friend has observed a definite outcome upon her measurement or not with-
out revealing what outcome she has observed. The friend could open the laboratory in a manner which
allowed communication (e.g. a specific message written on a piece of paper) to be passed outside to
Wigner, keeping all other degrees of freedom fully isolated. Obviously, it is of central importance
that the message does not contain any information concerning the specific observed outcome (which
would destroy the coherence of state (1)), but merely an indication of the kind: ”I have observed a
definite outcome” or ”I have not observed a definite outcome”. If the message is encoded in the state
of system M , the overall state is:
|Φ〉SFM = 1√
2
(|z+〉S |Fz+〉F + |z−〉S |Fz−〉F ) |”I have observed a definite outcome”〉M , (2)
since the state of the message is factorized out from the total state. (I leave the option for the message
”I have not observed a definite outcome” out, as it conflicts our experience of the situation that we refer
to as measurement and it also can be used to violate the bound on quantum state discrimination [10].)
If we assume universality of quantum theory in the sense that it can be applied at any scale,
including the apparatus, the entire laboratory and even the observer’s memory, we conclude that the
message will indicate that the friend perceives a definite outcome and yet Wigner will confirm his
state assignment (1). This should be contrasted to the ”collapse models” by Ghirardi, Rimini and
Weber [6] or by Diosi [7] and Penrose [8], which predict a breakdown of the quantum-mechanical
laws at some scale. In presence of such a collapse, the prediction based on Wigner’s state assignment
will statistically deviate from the result obtained in the verification test.
C. The no-go theorem
We have seen that Wigner not only perceives his own facts. He is also able to obtain a direct
evidence for the existence of the friend’s facts (although without knowing which specific outcome
4FIG. 1: Deutsch’s version of the Wigner-friend thought experiment. An observer (Wigner’s friend) performs
a Stern-Gerlach experiment on a spin 1/2 particle in a sealed laboratory. The outcome, either “spin up” or “spin
down”, is recorded in the friend’s laboratory, including her memory. A super-observer (Wigner) describes the
entire experiment as a unitary transformation resulting in an encompassing entangled state between the system
and the friend’s laboratory. The friend is allowed to communicate a message which only reports whether she
sees a definite outcome or not, without in any way revealing the actual outcome she observes.
has been realized in the laboratory). This strongly suggests that Wigner’s and Wigner’s friend’ facts
coexist. We pose the question: Is there a theoretical framework, potentially going beyond quantum
theory, in which one can account for observer-independent facts, ones that hence can be called ”facts
of the world”? In such a framework, one could assign jointly truth values to both the observational
statement A1: ”The pointer of Wigner’s friend’ apparatus points to result z+” and A2: ”The pointer
of Wigner’s apparatus points to result Φ.”
One important remark: Whenever Wigner performs his measurement, he can inform the friend
about the outcome he observed. Hence, Wigner’s friend can learn Wigner’s outcome in addition to
the outcome she herself observed directly. In this way, Wigner can know the truth values of both
statements A1 and A2. The assumption of ”observer-independent facts” is a stronger condition: we
require an assignment of truth values to statements A1 and A2 independently of which measurement
Wigner performs. Wigner can either perform his verifying experiment, or he can perform Wigner’s
friend’s measurement (for example by opening the lab, or learning it from the friend). In either exper-
iment, the observed outcome (e.g. ”Φ” and ”z+”, respectively) is required to reveal the assigned truth
value for A1 or A2. We formalize the requirement of ”observer-independent facts” in the following
assumption.
Postulate. (”Observer-independent facts”) The truth values of the propositions Ai of all observers
form a Boolean algebra A. Moreover, the algebra is equipped with a (countably additive) positive
measure p(A) ≥ 0 for all statements A ∈ A, which is the probability for the statement to be true.
In the proof, we will only use the conjunction of propositions of different observers, which is a
weaker requirement. Furthermore, we use a countably additive measure since we are dealing with
only a countable (in fact only a finite) set of elements. In Boolean algebra, one can build the con-
junction, the disjunction and the negation of the statements . A typical example of a Boolean alge-
bra is set theory. The operations are identified with the set theoretic intersection, union, and com-
plement respectively. This is significant in the context of classical physics, where the propositions
can be represented by subsets of a phase space. In the present context, one can jointly assign truth
values ”true” or ”false” to statements A1 and A2 about observations made by Wigner’s friend and
Wigner, respectively. Moreover, one can build the conjunction A1 ∩ A2 and assign joint probability
p(A1 = ±1, A2 = ±1), whereA1 is observed by the friend andA2 by Wigner (and where truth value
”true” corresponds to value 1 and ”false” to -1). Note that since observables corresponding to A1 and
A2 do not commute with each other, this amounts to introducing of ”hidden variables”, for which we
now formulate a Bell’s theorem.
5Theorem. (No-go theorem for ”observer-independent facts”) The followings statements are incom-
patible (i.e. lead to a contradiction)
1. ”Universal validity of quantum theory”1. Quantum predictions hold at any scale, even if the
measured system contains objects as large as an ”observer” (including her laboratory, mem-
ory etc.).
2. “Locality”. The choice of the measurement settings of one observer has no influence on the
outcomes of the other distant observer(s).
3. “Freedom of choice”. The choice of measurement settings is statistically independent from the
rest of the experiment.
4. “Observer-independent facts”2. One can jointly assign truth values to the propositions about
observed outcomes (“facts”) of different observers (as specified in the postulate above).
FIG. 2: A Bell experiment on two entangled observers in a Wigner-friend scenario. The super-observers Alice
and Bob perform their respective measurements on laboratories containing the observers Charlie and Debbie,
who both perform a Stern-Gerlach measurement on their respective spin-1/2 particles.
Proof. With reference to Fig. 2, consider a pair of super-observers (Alice and Bob), who can carry out
experiments on two systems that include a laboratory for each system, in each of which an observer
(Charlie and Debbie, respectively) performs a measurement on a spin-1/2 particle. We consider a
Bell inequality test and assume that Alice chooses between two measurement settingsA1 andA2, and
similarly Bob chooses between B1 and B2. The settings A1 and A2 correspond to the observational
statements Charlie and Alice can make about their respective outcomes, respectively. Similarly, the
settings B1 and B2 correspond to observational statements of Debbie and Bob respectively. The
assumptions (2), (3) and (4) together amount for the existence of local hidden variables that predefine
the values for A1, A2, B1 and B2 to be +1 or −1. Moreover, the assumptions imply the existence
of the joint probability p(A1, A2, B1, B2) whose marginals satisfy the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
inequality (CHSH): S = 〈A1B1〉+ 〈A1B2〉+ 〈A2B1〉− 〈A2B2〉 ≤ 2. Here, for example, 〈A1B1〉 =∑
A1,B1=−1,1A1B1p(A1, B1) and p(A1, B1) =
∑
A2,B2=−1,1 p(A1, A2, B1, B2) and similarly for
other cases.
1 Here we use the word ”universal” in the sense of Peres [11]: ”There is nothing in quantum theory making it applicable to
three atoms and inapplicable to 1023 ... Even if quantum theory is universal, it is not closed. A distinction must be made
between endophysical systems – those which are described by the theory – and exophysical ones, which lie outside the
domain of the theory (for example, the telescopes and photographic plates used by astronomers for verifying the laws
of celestial mechanics). While quantum theory can in principle describe anything, a quantum description cannot include
everything. In every physical situation something must remain unanalyzed. This is not a flaw of quantum theory, but a
logical necessity ...”
2 The theorem can be derived by replacing assumptions 2, 3 and 4 with a single assumption of Bell’s ”local causality”.
The latter already implies the existence of (local) probabilities for ”joint facts” for Wigner and Wigner’s friend [13],
which is the subject of the present no-go theorem. The reason for working with the present choice of assumptions is
that the relevance of the theorem for the propositions different observers make about their respective outcome become
apparent.
6Suppose that Charlie and Debbie initially share an entangled state of two spin-1/2 particles S1 and
S2 in a state
|ψ〉S1S2 = − sin
θ
2
|φ+〉S1S2 + cos
θ
2
|ψ−〉S1S2 , (3)
where |φ+〉S1S2 = 1√2(|z+〉S1 |z+〉S2 + |z−〉S1 |z−〉S2) and |ψ−〉S1S2 =
1√
2
(|z+〉S1 |z−〉S2 −
|z−〉S1 |z+〉S2) and the first spin is in possession of Charlie and the second of Debbie. The state
can be obtained by applying rotation (1 ⊗ e− i2 θσy)|ψ−〉S1S2 to the singlet state |ψ−〉S1S2 =
1√
2
(|z+〉S1 |z−〉S2 − |z−〉S1 |z+〉S2), where θ is the angle of rotation of Debbie’s spin around y-
axis and σy is a Pauli matrix. This particular choice of the state enables all measured observabes to
be either of the Wigner’s friend’ type, or of Wigner’s type.
For Alice and Bob, the overall state of the spins together with Charlie’s and Debbie’s laboratories
is initially
|Ψ0〉 = |ψ〉S1S2 |0〉C |0〉D, (4)
in agreement with assumption 1. The state |0〉C |0〉D of the two observers does not require further
characterization, except for the description of observers capable of completing a measurement.
Now Charlie and Debbie each perform a measurement of the respective spin along the z direction.
This measurement procedure is described as an unitary transformation from the point of view of
Alice and Bob. We assume that after Charlie and Debbie complete their measurement, the overall
state becomes
|Ψ˜〉 = − sin θ
2
|Φ+〉+ cos θ
2
|Ψ−〉, (5)
where
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|Aup|Bup〉+ |Adown〉|Bdown〉), (6)
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|Aup〉|Bdown〉 − |Adown〉|Bup〉) (7)
and
|Aup〉 = |z+〉S1 |Cz+〉C , |Bup〉 = |z+〉S2 |Dz+〉D, (8)
|Adown〉 = |z−〉S1 |Cz−〉C , |Bdown〉 = |z−〉S2 |Dz−〉D. (9)
We take now θ = pi/4 and define two sets of (binary) observables which play the same role of
a spin (Pauli) operators along the z and x axis respectively: Az = |Aup〉〈Aup| − |Adown〉〈Adown|
and Ax = |Aup〉〈Adown| + |Adown〉〈Aup| for Alice and similarly Bz and Bx for Bob. In the Bell
experiment, Alice chooses between A1 = Az and A2 = Ax, whereas Bob chooses between B1 = Bz
and B2 = Bx. Note that Alice and Bob each choose between the friend’s (A1 and B1) and Wigner’s
(A2 and B2) type of measurement. The Bell test with these measurement settings and state (5) results
in SQ = 2
√
2. The violation of the inequality implies that the conjunction of the assumptions (1-4)
used to derive it is untenable.
In Appendix we present a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger type of the theorem with three Wigners
and three friends. There the discrepancy between quantum theory and the theories respecting (2-4) is
no more of probabilistic, but deterministic nature.
We conclude that Wigner, even as he has a clear evidence for the occurrence of a definite outcome
in the friend’s laboratory, cannot assume any specific value for the outcome to coexist together with
7the directly observed value of his outcome, given that all other assumptions are respected. Moreover,
there is no theoretical framework where one can assign jointly the truth values to observational propo-
sitions of different observers (they cannot build a single Boolean algebra) under these assumptions. A
possible consequence of the result is that there cannot be facts of the world per se, but only relative to
an observer in agreement with Rovelli’s relative-state interpretation [3], Quantum Bayesianism3 [5],
as well as the (neo)-Copenhagen interpretation [10]. It is interesting to note that a similar view was
expressed by Jammer as early as in 1974 [18], when he wrote that ”the description of the state of a sys-
tem, rather than being restricted to the particle (or systems of particles) under observation, expresses
a relation between the particle and all the measurement devices involved.” Other possible interpreta-
tions of violation of Bell’s inequalities include violations of assumption 1 in collapse models [6–8],
of assumption 2 in non-local hidden variable models such as de Broglie-Bohm theory [14] or of as-
sumption 3. in superdeterministic theories [15]. The proper account of the result in the many-worlds
interpretation should be found in the interpretations account of Bell’s inequality violation [16, 17]
and points again to observer-dependent facts as they depend on the branch of the many worlds.
D. Relation to the paper by Frauchiger and Renner, arXiv: 1604.07422
Building upon works by Deutsch [9], Hardy [25, 26] and Ref. [10] reviewed above, Frauchiger and
Rennen [19] proposed an ”extended Wigner-friend thought experiment”, from which they concluded
that ”single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent”. The implications of
their argument have been discussed since then [5, 21–23].
The claim of Ref. [19] is based on an incompatibility proof stating that there cannot exist a physical
theory T that would fulfill the following three properties (informal versions, see Ref. [19] for details):
(QT): ”Compliance with quantum theory: T forbids all measurement results that are forbidden by
standard quantum theory (and this condition holds even if the measured system is large enough
to contain itself an experimenter).”
(SW): ”Single-world: T rules out the occurrence of more than one single outcome if an experimenter
measures a system once.”
(SC): ”Self-consistency: T’s statements about measurement outcomes are logically consistent (even
if they are obtained by considering the perspectives of different experimenters).”
Property (QT) is essentially a weaker version of our assumption 1 where it is sufficient to require the
validity of quantum theory for results with vanishing probability (as the argument is possibilistic, not
probabilistic). An example of a theory violating property (SW) is the many-worlds interpretation of
quantum theory.
The argument combines a set of statements that involves different observers F1, F2, A and W and
can be drawn on the basis of theory T:
S1: If F1 sees r = t, then W sees w 6= ok.
S2: If F2 sees z = +, then F1 sees r = t.
S3: If A sees x = ok, then F2 sees z = +.
S4: W sees w = ok and is told by A that x = ok.
3 Already in 1996 in the ”Replies to Referee 4” of Ref. [4], Fuchs drew a distinction between ”facts for the agent” and
”facts for everybody”.
8The specific type of quantum state, measurements and outcomes involved in the argument is not
relevant for further discussion and will be omitted here.
Property (SC) is crucial in a step of the proof, where one combines ”nested” statements (S1 to
S4) [20]. In the first step, the self-consistency property (SC) implies the following implication
Sa ∩ Sb =⇒ Sc (10)
where ∩ denotes logical ”and”, and the statements are of the type
Sa: Observer W assigns the truth value ”true” to the statement: ”A sees x = ok”;
Sb: Observer A assigns the truth value ”true” to the statement: ”If x = ok, then F2 sees z = +”;
Sc: Observer W assigns the truth value ”true” to the statement: ”A concludes that F2 sees
z = +”.
By repeating reasoning (10) in an iterative way, starting from statement S4 to S1, one arrives at a new
statement
T: Observer W concludes that A concludes that F2 concludes that F1 concludes that w 6= ok.
It is important to note that this statement refers to W’s conclusion about what other observers conclude
when they apply T conditional on the outcomes they observe. It is not a statement about his directly
observed outcome.
In the second step, the self-consistency property (SC) is used to arrive at an implication of the
following type
T =⇒ S. (11)
where the implied statement is
S: Observer W concludes that w 6= ok,
which stands in logical contradiction with W’s directly observed outcome w = ok.
The second step is non-trivial. It enables to promote others’ knowledge based on their observations
to ones’ own knowledge and then to put this ”promoted knowledge” in logical comparison with ones’
own knowledge gained through direct observation. Through implication (11), the self-consistency
property (SC) enables observational statements of other observers (A, F2 and F1) to be logically
compared with ones (W) own. This has the same predictive power as a theoretical framework in
which the truth values of statements of different observers can jointly be assigned and compared. To
see this, denote statements Si, i = 1, 2, 3 as implications S1: (P =⇒ Q), S2: (Q =⇒ R) and S3:
(R =⇒ S), where P: ”A sees x = ok”, Q: ”F2 sees z = +”, R: ”F1 sees r = t” and S: ”W sees
w 6= ok”. Then, ”collapsing” others’ knowledge into W’s knowledge via Eq. (11) is equivalent in its
implications to considering all the statements as belonging to a single Boolean algebra (i.e. they are
now all propositions of observer W, who can apply logical operations on them) for which one can use
the transitivity of implication to arrive at [P ∩ (P =⇒ Q) ∩ (Q =⇒ R) ∩ (R =⇒ S)] =⇒ S.
Statement S is again in a logical contradiction to W’s directly observed outcome w = ok.
We have seen that an existence of a single Boolean algebra for truth values for observational state-
ments of different observers is incompatible with the assumptions of ”locality”, ”freedom of choices”
and the predictions of quantum theory, which does not impose any constraints on the objects it is ap-
plied to. This might be interpreted as an indication that the strong conclusions implied by the theorem
of Ref. [19] rely on a too restrictive requirement of property (SC) on a physical theory. The require-
ment needs not only be fulfilled in quantum theory, but in other physical theories as well. An example
9was provided by Sudbery [22]: In the special theory of relativity, due to time dilation, every inertial
observer can claim that her/his clock ticks slower than that of a moving partner. This apparent con-
tradiction in predictions of different observers is resolved when one realizes that the statements only
have meaning with respect to the specific, observer-dependent measurement procedures that define
”simultaneity”. Similarly, the states referring to outcomes of different observers in a Wigner-friend
type of experiment cannot be defined without referring to the specific experimental arrangements of
the observers, in agreement with Bohr’s idea of contextuality as formulated by him in 1963 [24]: ”the
unambiguous account of proper quantum phenomena must, in principle, include a description of all
relevant features of experimental arrangement.”
I conclude with a remark that the theorem by Frauchiger and Renner has deep conceptual value,
as it points to the necessity to differentiate between ones’ knowledge about direct observations and
ones’ knowledge about others’ knowledge that is compatible with physical theories. It is likely that
understanding this difference will be an important ingredient in further development of the method of
Bayesian inference in situations as in the Wigner-friend experiment.
I acknowledge helpful discussions with Mateus Arau´jo, Veronika Baumann, Ada´n Cabello, Giulio
Chiribella, Christopher Fuchs, Borivoje Dakic´, Philipp Ho¨hn, Nikola Paunkovic´, Lı´dia del Rio,
Ru¨diger Schack and Stefan Wolf. I would like to especially acknowledge the fruitful discussions
with Renato Renner and thank him for providing notes summarizing that discussion.
I. APPENDIX
The Bell theorem from the main text can be extended to a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ)
version [27] with three friends and three Wigners. Since the incompatibility of assumptions 1.-4.
is not of a probabilistic but rather of a deterministic nature, this version of the theorem completely
bypasses any use of the notion of probability, similarly to the version by Frauchiger and Renner [19].
Consider three spatially separated observers (Wigners), Alice, Bob and Cleve. They each perform
a measurement on a subsystem of a tripartite system. Each of the subsystems includes a further
observer, Debbie, Eric, and Fiona (Wigner’s friends), who perform a Stern-Gerlach measurement
of spin along x of their respective spin-1/2 particles. Alice measures Debbie and her spin particle,
Bob measures Eric and his spin particle, and finally, Cleve measures Fiona and her spin particle.
We consider a GHZ test where Alice chooses between two measurement settings: A1 and A2, Bob
between B1 and B2 and Cleve between C1 and C2. The assumptions 2., 3. and 4. imply that A1, A2,
B1, B2, C1 and C2 have predefined values +1 or −1.
Define Aˆx = |Aup〉〈Aup|−|Adown〉〈Adown| and Aˆy = i(|Aup〉〈Adown|−|Adown〉〈Aup|) for Alice
and similarly Bˆx and Bˆy for Bob and Cˆx and Cˆy for Cleve, where
|Aup〉 = |x+〉A1|Dx+〉A2, |Bup〉 = |x+〉B1|Ex+〉B2 |Cup〉 = |x+〉C1|Fx+〉C2, (12)
|Adown〉 = |x−〉A1|Dx−〉A2, |Bdown〉 = |x−〉B1|Ex−〉B2 |Cdown〉 = |x−〉C1|Fx−〉C2. (13)
In the GHZ test, we choose Aˆ1 = Aˆx, Aˆ2 = Aˆy for Alice and similarly for Bob and Cleve.
Assume that Alice, Bob and Cleve perform these measurements on a shared GHZ state:
|ΨGHZ〉ABC = 1√
2
(|A+〉|B+〉|C+〉 − |A−〉|B−〉|C−) , (14)
where due to assumption 1 we presume that such a state can be prepared and |A±〉 = 1√
2
(|Aup〉 ±
|Adown〉), |B±〉 = 1√2(|Bup〉 ± |Bdown〉) and |C±〉 =
1√
2
(|Cup〉 ± |Cdown〉).
In order to reproduce perfect correlations in the GHZ state, the predefined values need to satisfy
AxByCy = AyBxCy = AyByCx = 1. These equations imply then that AxBxCx = 1, however one
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finds the opposite result in quantum mechanics: AˆxBˆxCˆx|ΨGHZ〉ABC = −|ΨGHZ〉ABC .
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